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Abstract—  Despite  a  total budget  increase  for  rural 
development  in  the  new  programming  period  (2007-
2013),  for  most  older  Member  States  in  the  now 
expanded  European  Union  the  multi-annual  spending 
plan  for  the  period  2007-2013  predicts  a  substantial 
decrease of the budget for rural development and thus 
for  agri-environmental  schemes  (AESs).  It  can  be 
assumed that nothing or only part of this loss could be 
compensated  by  national  funds  in  most  countries. 
Therefore designing more efficient national governance 
structures for AESs, which decrease public transaction 
costs  (TCs),  would  be  an  appropriate  answer  to  this 
problem.  The  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  define  the 
factors  influencing  these  public  TCs,  because  then 
appropriate  action  can  be  taken  to  reduce  them.  A 
statistical  analysis  with  a  proxy  for  public  TCs  is 
combined with an analysis of the perception on public 
TCs influencing factors of the stakeholders involved (not 
including  farmers).  The  research  showed  that  mainly 
scheme  related  factors  are  perceived  to  be  important, 
although  the  governance  structure,  institutional 
environment and trust also play a role. High public TCs 
are  however  not  necessarily  a  problem,  if  they  would 
lead  to  a  higher  environmental  effectiveness  of  the 
schemes.  It  is  important  to  pay  attention  to  the 
heterogeneity  of  the  natural  environment  and  on  the 
basis  of  that  decide  for  a  more  centralised  or 
decentralised approach to AES design. 
Keywords—  Public  transaction  costs,  agri-
environmental schemes 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Agri-environmental  schemes  (AESs),  with  the 
implementation  of  Reg.  (EC)  1257/1999  a  core 
element of the second pillar of the European Common 
Agricultural Policy, are currently entangled in critical 
debates questioning their environmental effectiveness 
[1-4].  However,  the  economic  efficiency  of  the 
schemes also deserves attention. Especially in the light 
of  recent  changes  in  the  European  budget  for  rural 
development,  which  provides  up  till  55%  of  the 
funding  for  the  schemes
1,  this  last  concern  can  be 
justified.  Despite  a  total  budget  increase  for  rural 
development in the new programming period (2007-
2013) compared to the old (2000-2006) one [5, 6], for 
most ‘old’ countries
2 in the now expanded European 
Union the multi-annual spending plan for the period 
2007-2013  predicts  a  substantial  decrease  of  the 
budget for rural development, which is mainly caused 
by  the  increased  number  of  Member  States  (27 
compared to 15 in 2000-2004 and 25 in 2004-2006). 
Next to this, new responsibilities were added to the 
rural  development  policy  such  as  support  linked  to 
Natura 2000 areas. Taking into account these changes, 
the  Commission  asked for  a  higher  budget than  the 
one that was agreed upon by the Council. Even if the 
funding  would  have  remained  the  same,  one  could 
wonder  whether  it  would  be  sufficient  in  the  new 
programming period because it builds on the first one, 
and is therefore immediately operative and bound to 
agreements  already  entered  into.  It  can  be  assumed 
that,  nothing  or  only  part  of  this  loss  could  be 
compensated  by  national  funds  in  most  countries. 
Additionally, most countries are faced with stronger 
budget  restrictions  for  their  Administrations. 
Designing  more  efficient  national  governance 
structures for AESs, which decrease public transaction 
costs (TCs), would be an appropriate answer to this 
problem. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to 
define  the  factors  influencing  these  public  TCs, 
because then appropriate action can be taken to reduce 
them. When judging TCs related to AESs, however, 
the  costs  for  missing  the  target  (CMT)  or  the 
environmental utility losses shall always be taken into 
account,  since  it  is  the  sum  of  TCs  and  CMT  that 
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2  These  countries  are  Germany,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Ireland, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland   2 
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should  be  minimised  to  design  measures  with  the 
optimal precision [7]. 
First  an  overview  will  be  given  of  the  literature 
concerning the factors influencing public transaction 
costs  regarding  agri-environmental  policies.  This  is 
followed by a description of the methodology used to 
assess these factors. Results are presented in the fourth 
section  and  critically  discussed  in  the  last  part, 
including  some  policy  recommendations  for 
decreasing public TCs regarding AESs.  
II. DEFINITION AND BACKGROUND 
TCs, which can be defined as the costs arising not 
from the production of goods, but from their transfer 
from one agent to another [8], are currently gaining 
importance  in  socio-economic  research  on  agri-
environmental policies [9-12]. From a transaction cost 
economics point of view, an AES can indeed be seen 
as  a  transaction  between  the  farmer  and  the 
government, who respectively represent the seller and 
the  buyer  of  the  agri-environmental  goods  and 
services.  The  costs  directly  resulting  from  this 
transaction are called private TCs when borne by the 
farmer and public TCs when borne by the government. 
A  direct  transaction  between  citizens  and  farmers 
suffers from the absence of fully articulated property 
rights,  which  leads  to  market  failure  and  hence 
governmental  organisation  of  AESs  [13,  14]. 
According to Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), and 
its principle of discriminating alignment, the chosen 
mode  of  governance  has  to  match  with  the 
characteristics of the transaction in such a way that the 
costs incurred are minimised [15].  
Following  this  principle,  the  present  governance 
form could indeed minimise the costs. However, there 
are  also  other  factors  which  might  influence  public 
TCs  regarding  AESs.  The  analysis  of  public  TC 
influencing factors in this paper is not only done on 
the basis of measurements of these costs, but also on 
the perception of the stakeholders involved in AESs. 
Buckley  and  Chapman  [16],  investigating  the 
influence  of  TCs  on  managerial  decision  making 
found out that managers very often don’t know what 
TCs  are,  but  that  they  do  take  them  into  account, 
although not in a numerical way. They therefore claim 
a higher importance of the perception of TCs, since 
this determines their effect on decision making. This 
view  is  shared  in  this  paper,  hence  the  choice  of 
working with perceptions supplementary to time data. 
The data used have been collected in the framework of 
the European research project ITAES
3 and reflect the 
situation  regarding  AESs  in  Europe.  However,  the 
scope of the results goes beyond the European case 
and can even be extended towards other policy areas 
than the agri-environmental one. 
III. FACTORS INFLUENCING PUBLIC TCs 
RELATED TO AESs 
According  to  Oliver  E.  Williamson,  the  main 
founding father of the TCE theory, TCs are influenced 
by:  (1)  the  behaviour  of  the  actors  involved  in  the 
transaction, (2) the attributes of the transaction, which 
are  the  asset  specificity  of  the  transacted  good  or 
service,  the  frequency  of  the  transaction  and  the 
uncertainty regarding the outcomes of the transaction, 
(3)  the  institutional  arrangements  or  governance 
structures  and  (4)  the  institutional  environment  in 
which the transaction takes place [17]. Specifically for 
agri-environmental policies, several empirical studies 
are  available  dealing  with  this  topic,  which  will  be 
described in the next paragraphs. 
In  a  comparable  large  scale  European  research 
project on AESs (STEWPOL), Falconer and Whitby 
[18]  found  numerous  factors  influencing 
administrative  cost  levels.  First  of  all  there  is  the 
farmers’ attitudes towards and understanding of AESs. 
North  [19]  also  mentioned  that  a  common  ideology 
between  the  actors  in  the  transaction  may  reduce 
public TCs, since it entails a smaller need for control. 
Closely connected to this factor are the observability 
of compliance by farmers and the technology available 
for monitoring and administration [18]. Fullerton [20] 
also  mentions  monitoring  technologies  as  important 
public  TC  influencing  factors  [20].  Scheme 
transparency,  the  scheme  objectives,  the  degree  to 
which they are pursued and the degree of targeting of 
the schemes can be connected to Williamson’s factor 
of asset specificity [18]. In the same study finally the 
regularity  of  interactions  between  regulators  and 
participants,  the  time  since  scheme  implementation 
                                                            
3 Integrated Tools to design and implement Agri-Environmental 
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and the potential for economies of scale are mentioned 
as  influencing  factors, relating  then to Williamson’s 
final  attribute  of  frequency  of  the  transaction.  The 
former two factors refer to the possible occurrence of 
learning effects when implementing AESs, but also to 
the  creation  of  trust  between  the  actors  in  the 
transaction.  
Learning  effects,  or  scheme  experience,  and 
economies  of  scale  with  higher  participation  levels 
come back as influencing factors in a later article of 
Falconer et al. [13]. Whitby [14] adds the time in the 
lifecycle of the schemes as a factor influencing public 
TCs with higher costs in the first phase of establishing 
the schemes and setting up the contracts. Stavins [21] 
concluded  that,  next  to  the  frequency  of  the 
transactions and uncertainty, the TCs depend on the 
number of trading partners involved in the transaction 
with lower TCs per participant when the number of 
participants  increases.  The  same  influencing  factors 
come back in Eklund’s [1999, cited in 22] research on 
TCs of the Swedish agri-environmental program. She 
however  also  mentions  the  level  of  education  and 
heterogeneity of the people affected by the policy, and 
institutional influencing factors such as the design of 
the AESs and the general administrative institutions. 
When  investigating  the  TCs  involved  in  different 
agricultural policies, Rørstad et al. [23] found that TCs 
vary  according  to  the  point  of  policy  application: 
policy instruments applied to a commodity in the case 
of jointness in production between public and private 
goods (e.g. taxes on pesticides) will involve lower TCs 
than  instruments  aimed  directly  at  the  public  good 
(e.g. support for special landscape ventures). Eggers 
[7] also points at the influence of institutional factors 
on  public  TCs  related  to  AESs,  with  higher  TCs 
connected  to  a  more  decentralised  approach  of 
designing  AESs  (e.g.  in  a  regional  Agricultural-
Environmental  Forum).  However,  decentralisation 
could lead to lower environmental utility losses when 
the environment is heterogeneous across the country, 
because  the  schemes  are  then  better  adapted  to  the 
local environmental conditions.  
Another  possible  influence  of  the  institutional 
governance structure can come from whether farmers 
can  take  up  single  agri-environmental  measures,  a 
combination of measures in AESs or there is a whole 
farm approach like in Ireland or the UK. Offering a 
combination of measures to farmers has an equivalent 
in  the  business  world  as  the  ‘block  booking’  of 
movies.  According  to  Kenney  and  Klein  [24],  this 
bundling  leads  to  economization  on  measurement 
costs  and  reduces  time  and  resources  spent  on 
redundant sorting and repricing. As an equivalent, the 
bundling of agri-environmental measures in schemes 
or  whole-farm  approaches  could  also  reduce  the 
efforts of the responsible Administration. On the other 
hand, the tuning of the measures in a scheme could 
increase its design costs. Related to this is the concept 
of connectedness, which means that transactions can 
be linked to each other and this can influence the costs 
involved.  Whether  this  connectedness  leads  to 
decreasing  total  TCs  (e.g.  because  two  regulations 
require  the  same  administrative  tasks)  or  increasing 
total TCs (e.g. because more coordination is required) 
depends on the situation [25]. 
Finally, different types of TC could be positively or 
negatively  correlated  with  each  other,  such  as  high 
costs  for  stakeholder  participation  at  an  early  stage 
could decrease monitoring and enforcement costs later 
[26].  
From these literature results, some hypotheses can 
be derived which will serve as a basis for the research. 
These  hypotheses,  which  will  be  explained  in  this 
paragraph, are schematically represented in Figure 1. 
First  of  all,  the  arrow  from  public  TC  towards  the 
same  box  represents  the  hypothesis  that  TCs  are 
interrelated. Behavioural characteristics of the actors 
influencing  TCs  are:  the  identity  of  the  actors 
involved, the type of participation of the actors in the 
transaction,  the  number  of  actors  involved,  and  the 
relationship  (trust)  between  the  actors.  Attributes  of 
the transaction influencing public TCs regarding AESs 
are:  the  number  of  AESs,  the  complexity  or 
transparency of AESs, the precision of the schemes, 
their age, the time in the lifecycle of AESs and the 
observability of compliance by farmers. Institutional 
governance  structures  influence  public  TCs  by  the 
point of policy application of the schemes and the fact 
whether  farmers  can  take  up  single  measures, 
schemes, or there is a whole farm approach in place. 
Elements  of  the  broader  institutional  environment 
having  an  influence  are  the  (de)centrality  of  the 
Administration,  EU  regulations  and  the  national 
administrative structures. Finally, an influence of the   4 
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natural  environment  in  which  the  AESs  have  to  be 
designed is expected. 
Much of the literature described above made use of 
primary  or  secondary  data  of  public  TCs  regarding 
AESs to identify the influencing factors. Next section 
will  describe  how  the  methodology  used  in  this 
research  deviates from  beaten  paths  and chooses  an 
alternative approach. 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
Because of the scope of this study, which comprises 
a  total  of  nine  European  countries,  obtaining 
government figures on TCs and using secondary data 
to  identify  public  TC  influencing  factors  was  a 
difficult  task.  Therefore  a  standardised  face-to-face 
questionnaire was chosen with Likert scale variables 
and containing both closed and open questions. The 
advantage of this kind of structured interview is that it 
can be used to asses perception of TCs. Problems with 
this approach are the high costs and the fact that it’s 
time-consuming. Moreover, respondents are asked to 
estimate future costs or remember costs in the past, 
which could lead to less reliable results [10]. 
Table 1 depicts the obtained sample and shows that 
in  general  the  Agricultural  Administration  is 
represented  most  in  the  sample,  followed  by  the 
Environmental  Administration  and  farmers 
associations.  Environmental  associations  and 
researchers  are  represented  to  a  smaller  extent. 
Because of the purpose to interview all actors from all 
administrative levels who are or should be involved in 
the  design  of  AESs,  representatives  from  hunting, 
tourism, consumer or any other associations were also 
questioned.  However,  the  number  of  respondents  in 
these groups is too small to conduct reliable statistical 
tests. Therefore, all groups with less than ten members 
are summarised in a group ‘Others’. The distribution 
of  respondents  over  the  different  categories  in  all 
countries  reflects  somehow  the  structure  of  relevant 
and  interested  actors  in  the  field  of  AESs  in  each 
country. 
In  identifying  factors  influencing  public  TCs,  the 
first method used was to find a proxy for TCs involved 
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Fig. 1: Factors influencing public TCs   5 
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then be used as a dependent variable in a statistical 
regression  containing  several  explaining  variables 
obtained  through  the  questionnaire.  The  proxy  for 
public TCs chosen in this research is the percentage of 
the  working  time  the  individual  respondents,  apart 
from the farmers, spent on AESs. The second method 
involves  the  perception  of  public  TC  influencing 
factors.  The  respondents  were  specifically  asked  to 
assess which factors they perceive to influence public 
TCs. These factors were given, based on the literature 
review, but the respondents could also give comments 
on them and add other factors in an open question. 
This  yields  important  qualitative  information,  which 
can  help  with  the  interpretation  of  the  statistically 
obtained results. 
V. RESULTS: FACTORS INFLUENCING PUBLIC 
TCs REGARDING AESs 
A. Finding public TC influencing factors through 
statistical analysis with a proxy 
As  mentioned  in  the  methodological  part,  one 
approach in determining public TC influencing factors 
is to do a statistical analysis with a proxy for public 
TCs  serving  as  a  dependent  variable.  The  proxy 
chosen  here  is  the  percentage  of  the  working  time 
spent on one particular activity in the spectrum of AES 
related activities, namely the design of the contracts. 
Although information on the time spent on other tasks 
is  also  available,  design  is  selected  because  other 
questions in the database are specifically related to this 
activity and can thus be incorporated in the statistical 
model.  The  implementation  part  was  given  less 
consideration  in  this  research  to  avoid  too  long 
questionnaires,  negatively  influencing  respondents’ 
participation. Of course, only those respondents really 
involved  in  design  were  included  in  the  statistical 
model.  
First of all, since this proxy variable of the share of 
the personal working time spent on design of AESs is 
not normally distributed, the natural logarithm of the 
time  is  used  as  dependent  variable.  Because  of 
multicollinearity, several variables had to be excluded 
from the model. The linear regression model obtained 
(see  Table  2)  shows  a  significant  effect  for  the 
frequency  of  information  exchange  with  farmers’ 
associations:  the  more  information  the  respondent 
exchanges with these associations, the less time spent 
on AES design. There was no influence of the actor 
group  (Agricultural/  Environmental  Administration/ 
Organisations, etc.) on AES design costs. A possible 
explanation for the decreasing effect on time spent on 
AES design of having frequent contacts with farmers’ 
associations could be that these organisations provide 
information  which  simplifies  AES  design.  An 
alternative  explanation  could  be  that  current  AESs 
Table 1. Number of respondents per type of organization by country 
Region/Type  AgAd  EnAd  FaAs  EnAs  Res  Other  Total 
Flanders (BE)  7  11  3  4  2  3  30 
Czech Republic (CZ)  12  8  5  5  3  3  36 
Finland (FI)  22  6  14  3  2  0  47 
Basse-Normandie (FR)  18  8  10  1  3  1  41 
Brandenburg (DE)  7  10  4  5  5  7  38 
Ireland (IE)  1  0  1  2  3  2  9 
Veneto & Emilia Romagna (IT)  8  3  9  2  5  3  30 
Friesland (NL)  4  2  2  2  7  2  19 
North England (UK)  6  7  2  9  2  3  29 
               
Total  85  55  50  33  32  24  279 
Legend:  AgAd: Agricultural Administration  EnAd: Environmental Administration 
FaAs: Farmer Association   EnAs: Environnemental Association 
Res: Research    6 
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comply  with  the  wishes  of  these  organisations  and 
they  have  little  to  comment  on  or  discuss  about 
concerning  the  design  process.  The  opinion  of  the 
respondent  on  the  statement  “The  Environmental 
Administration trusts farmers” also has an influence 
on time spent on AES design. If this trust is assessed 
to be higher, then more time is spent on design, which 
contradicts  theory.  This  statement  could  reveal  the 
respondent’s own trust in farmers. If the respondent 
has trust in the farmer, he/she will be more motivated 
to  create  the  best  AESs  for  them  which  then  takes 
more time. Or it could also be an effect instead of a 
cause:  because  so  much  time  is  spent  on  designing 
good  schemes,  the  respondent  trusts  that  farmers 
won’t break the contracts. Less time is spent on AES 
design  if  the  respondent  believes  that  reducing  the 
negative  impacts  of  agriculture  is  an  important 
objective of the AESs (p=0.050), then when the AESs 
are  believed  to  focus  on  stimulating  positive 
externalities  or  adapting  farming  systems  to  the 
changing  price  and  policy  environment.  The  NUTS 
level also has an influence: the higher the level, the 
more time is spent on AES design which reflects the 
actual centralised situation in design of AESs. Finally, 
the  model  shows  that  the  higher  the  perceived 
heterogeneity  of  water  quality  problems,  the  more 
time is spent on AES design.  
To  validate  these  results  and  get  a  better 
understanding however, further steps are needed. The 
next step consists of asking the stakeholders directly 
which  factors  they  believe  influence  costs  of  AES 
design.  
B. Assessing the perception on factors influencing 
public TCs: quantitative approach 
In this part the question was posed which factors, 
which  were  predefined  by  the  researchers,  the 
respondents  perceive  to  have  an  influence  on  AES 
design  costs.  Figure  2  gives  the  results  for  all  the 
respondents  together,  with  the  mean  level  of 
agreement  on  the  Y-axis,  and  shows  that  the 
complexity of the schemes is considered as the most 
important factor influencing AESs design costs. The 
number of measures and the precision of the measures 
are of almost the same significance. Thus, according 
to  the  respondents,  public  TCs  are  most  strongly 
affected by the nature of the measures and the object 
of the transaction (the asset). Of lower importance are 
factors  related  to  the  institutional  environment  and 
governance structure, such as the (de)centrality of the 
Administration,  EU  regulations,  and  the  national 
Administrative  structure.  Factors  belonging  to  the 
category of the behaviour of the actors, as defined in 
the literature part, like the type of participation, the 
number  of  participants  and  the  identity  of  the 
participants are perceived to have a lower influence. 
Also the heterogeneity of the natural environment is 
perceived not to influence public TCs too much.  
Very  important  to  note  concerning  the  perceived 
influence of factors on AES design costs is the high 
Table 2. Linear regression model on public TC influencing 
factors 
 
Ln % of working time spent on AES design 
Variables  Coefficient  P 
frequency information exchange with 
researchers  0.112  0.418 
frequency information exchange with 
farmers' associations***  -0.497  0.001 
influence Environmental 
Administration on design process  -0.028  0.864 
influence environmental associations 
on design process  -0.068  0.723 
opinion EU Administration trusts 
Administration NUTS 0&1  -0.186  0.212 
opinion Environmental Administration 
trusts farmers**  0.373  0.044 
importance objective reducing 
negative impacts of agriculture**  -0.266  0.049 
NUTS0***  1.197  0.009 
NUTS2  0.368  0.420 
NUTS3  0.014  0.977 
LAU  -1.602  0.136 
seriousness environmental problems  0.042  0.320 
heterogeneity problem soil quality  -0.182  0.236 
heterogeneity problem water 
quality***  0.391  0.019 
heterogeneity problem biodiversity  0.032  0.832 
opinion agri-environmental problems 
interlinked  0.058  0.742 
constant  0.877  0.548 
Number of observations  84   
F-statistic  4.01   
Prob>F  0   
R²  0.489   
Significance level: ***= 0.01, **= 0.05, *= 0.1   7 
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number of respondents with no opinion on the matter. 
For every factor taken into consideration, between 30 
and 60 per cent of the respondents had no opinion. 
Especially the influence of the institutional structure 
on design costs was difficult to assess. The effect of 
the  number  of  measures,  their  complexity  and  the 
heterogeneity  of  the  natural  environment  was  the 
easiest  to  evaluate.  Detailed  analysis  reveals  that 
especially  the  type  of  organisation  a  respondent 
belongs  to  is  a  determining  factor  for  having  an 
opinion  on  factors  influencing  design  costs  or  not. 
Officers  from  the  Agricultural  Administration  and 
researchers have significantly more often an opinion 
on the factors influencing AES design costs than other 
groups (p= 0.000). The fact that respondents from the 
Environmental  Administration  more  often  give  no 
opinion  answers  than  their  colleagues  of  the 
Agricultural Administration may indicate their smaller 
involvement in the AES design process.  
Respondents were also explicitly asked to assess the 
level  of  knowledge  of  the  national  Agricultural 
Administration  on  public  TCs  regarding  AESs.  The 
same  question  was  asked  concerning  the  level  of 
knowledge on environmental utility losses caused by 
imprecise AESs, with the assumption behind it that the 
civil servants in the Administration have a better idea 
on  the environmental  effects  of  scheme  design  than 
financial  aspects  of  the  AES  design  and 
implementation  procedure.  For  both  TCs  and  utility 
losses, there is a high number of no opinion answers, 
with  respectively  28%  and  27%  of  interviewees, 
which indicates that in general people might not be 
occupied  much  with  these  issues.  If  the  respondent 
does have an opinion he tends to disagree more: the 
knowledge of the administration on these two topics is 
rather  limited.  For  the  statements  that  the 
Administration has a high knowledge on public TCs 
and  utility  losses,  a  mean  level  of  agreement  was 
found of respectively 2.6 (s.d
4. 1.2) and 2.4 (s.d. 1.1) 
on a scale with 5 being the highest level of agreement. 
So,  it  seems  that  the  interviewees  estimate  the 
knowledge  of  the  Administration  on  TCs  slightly 
higher  than  the  knowledge  on  environmental  utility 
losses.  However,  29%  of  the  interviewees  see  a 
difference between the different administrative levels 
of the Agricultural Administration (around 50% of the 
actors  again  had  no  opinion  on  this  question).  The 
open  question  related  to  this  topic  revealed  that 
although the opinion on which administrative level has 
the  greatest  knowledge  differs  substantially  between 
the respondents, knowledge on utilities losses due to 
imprecision  are  rather  noticed  at  lower  levels.  The 
explanation that is often given is that persons at such 
levels are closer to the issue of concern. For public 
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TCs, the respondents perceive a higher knowledge on 
higher administrative levels, although several point out 
that knowledge on TCs is generally scarce. 
Next to this quantitative approach on assessing the 
perception on public TC influencing factors, an open 
question  allowed  for  a  qualitative  approach  on  this 
matter. 
C. Assessing the perception on factors influencing 
public TCs: qualitative approach 
The  open  question  on  public  TCs regarding  AES 
design and implementation provoked a great diversity 
of  additional  comments  on  public  TCs  [for  more 
detailed  information,  see  27].  Despite  the  fact  that 
many  respondents  seem  to  find  TCs  an  interesting 
issue, there seems to have been little reflection on this 
leading  to  diverse  comments  and  a  lack  of  overall 
structure.  However,  issues  that  gained  particular 
attention  were  TCs  in  relation  to  regulations, 
effectiveness  and  costs  of  measures,  continuity  of 
AESs, distribution of cost components of AESs and 
knowledge and measurement of TCs.  
Concerning the impact of regulations on TCs, there 
were  complaints  that  EU  regulations  contribute  to 
increased  TCs,  e.g.  because  of  extensive  reporting 
requirements.  Some  respondents  suggest  that 
abandonment  of  national  co-financing  would  reduce 
TCs.  Others  point  at  the  impact  of  national 
administrative  procedures  in  the  application  process 
on TCs, and argue for the administrative pathway to 
be  simplified/shortened  to  reduce  TCs.  IT-solutions 
were  suggested  as  a  possible  way  to  achieve  this. 
Simplification of the application process would also 
benefit farmers, because some respondents claim that 
many farmers don’t have an overview anymore of the 
schemes and the Administrations responsible for them. 
The  relationship  between  the  effectiveness  of  the 
schemes and public TCs is a major issue in most case 
studies. The overall opinion seems to be that TCs can 
be high, as long as they are compensated by a high 
effectiveness of the schemes. This however seems to 
be  very  difficult  to  determine.  Several  respondents 
believe  that  TCs  for  AESs  are  currently  not  in 
proportion to the minor effects of the schemes. Some 
respondents  argue  that  AESs  should  actually  be 
evaluated  on  the  basis  of  their  environmental 
effectiveness  and  TCs  involved.  In  the  opinion  of 
several respondents increased complexity of schemes 
increases their TCs, but will bring greater benefits.  
Another  answer  coming  back  frequently  is  that 
continuity of AES policies could decrease TCs.  
In relation to the distribution of cost components of 
AESs, several respondents claim that implementation 
of the schemes is a very costly matter. Some suggest 
that control is most costly and too costly, and other 
respondents mention costly design and communication 
of the schemes. 
Several respondents believe that there is a lack of 
information and knowledge on TCs related to AESs, 
although some say this is because administrative work 
is difficult to value.  
Trust was also an issue coming back often in the 
open question. Overall, respondents believe that trust 
in  farmers  can  differ  a  lot  between  different 
Administrations  (with  a  higher  trust  by  Agricultural 
Administrations),  political  parties  and  finally  also 
persons.  A  lack  of  trust  would  however  increase 
control costs according to some respondents.  
The qualitative analysis shows that opinions on TCs 
are diverse and rather detailed. This might be due to 
lacking  discussions  on  TCs  between  and  within  all 
administrative levels and actor groups [27].  
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper different quantitative and qualitative 
techniques  were  combined  to  assess  public  TC 
influencing factors related to AESs and stakeholders’ 
perception  of  them.  Knowledge  on  public  TC 
influencing  factors  is  useful  in  order  to  take 
appropriate action to decrease these costs. 
In  the  perception  of  the  stakeholders  involved  in 
AESs,  farmers  not  included,  AES  design  costs  are 
mostly influenced by factors related to the object and 
attributes  of  the  transaction,  which  means  factors 
related to the schemes themselves. The complexity of 
the  schemes,  the  number  of  AESs  that  need  to  be 
designed and the required precision of the measures 
are  perceived  to  be  the  factors  with  the  highest 
influence. The open question however reveals that this 
doesn’t necessarily imply a wish for a smaller number 
of homogeneous AESs: good functioning AESs may 
be  costly.  When  judging  TCs,  costs  of  missing  the 
target  or  environmental  utility  losses  should  indeed   9 
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always be taken into account. However, a number of 
stakeholders  believe  that  the  high  TCs  involved  in 
current AESs don’t weigh up to their environmental 
benefits.  
Related  to  this,  the  statistical  model  shows  a 
significant  positive  relationship  between  the 
heterogeneity of the environmental problems and AES 
design costs, which in the perception of people is a 
less  important  influencing  factor.  It  also  identifies 
another  significantly  influencing  variable  in  this 
category,  namely  the  objective  of  the  scheme.  The 
model predicted lower AES design costs if the main 
objective  of  AESs  is  only  to  reduce  the  negative 
environmental  impacts  of  agriculture.  An  important 
reason  why  scheme-related  factors  are  identified  as 
most important could be related to the fact that they 
can be more easily pictured than for instance the effect 
of  the  institutional  governance  structure  or 
environment. The high number of no opinion answers 
obtained  within  the  latter  category  of  influencing 
factors is striking.  
In general, all questions related to TCs show a high 
number  of  no  opinion  answers,  indicating  little 
knowledge  of  the  stakeholders  on  this  topic. 
Stakeholders  that  do  have  an  opinion  assess  the 
knowledge  of  the  Agricultural  Administration 
regarding TCs as rather low, especially at the lower 
Administrative levels. This is somehow compensated 
by  a  perceived  higher  knowledge  on  environmental 
utility losses at these levels. These results indicate that 
organising  AESs  on  an  intermediate  Administrative 
level,  like  NUTS  2,  could  possibly  lead  to 
environmentally  more  effective  AESs  in  a 
heterogeneous  natural  environment,  without  causing 
too high TCs.  
In  the  perception  of  the  stakeholders,  who 
participates  in  the  design  process  is  not  such  an 
important  influencing  factor.  However,  the  model 
suggests  that  if  farmers’  associations  are  more 
frequently heard, AES design costs are lower. This can 
be  because  they  can  provide  useful  information  for 
AES design. Another explanation could be that current 
AESs comply with the wishes of these organisations 
and they have little to comment on or discuss about 
concerning the design process.  
Governance  structures  and  the  institutional 
environment,  such  as  the  (de)centrality  of  the 
Administration, the national Administrative structure 
and  EU  Regulations,  are  perceived  as  second  most 
important  factor  influencing  AES  design  costs.  EU 
Regulations often come back in the open question too. 
In  the  case  of  more  decentralised  structures,  the 
question arises whether the EU requirements could be 
fulfilled on all these lower Administrative levels. High 
TCs  could  possibly  impede  this,  so  more  flexibility 
could be required from the Commission. On the other 
hand, the strict EU regulations could be understood as 
a conscious strategy to save on TCs at EU level, but 
investigating  this  didn’t  belong  to  the  scope  of  this 
research.  
Trust  often  comes  back  in  the  research  as  TC 
influencing  factor.  The  model  shows  a  significant 
influence of trust, with higher design costs if trust of 
the Environmental Administration in farmers is high. 
This result runs counter to what theory predicts, but it 
could be that high trust indicates good relationships 
with farmers which would result in higher efforts to 
design good measures. Or, the trust in farmers could 
be  a  cause  of  having  well-designed  measures.  The 
open questions reveal that trust is a complicated issue, 
which  can  differ  according  to  the  type  of 
Administration, the political party in charge and also 
between  individual  people.  It  is  probably  also  more 
related  to  monitoring  and  control  costs  than  design 
costs involved in AESs. 
Finally, the low knowledge on TCs in general often 
comes back in the open question. These results prove 
again  that  TCs  are  a  concept  that  cannot  be  easily 
grasped, belonging more to the intuitive knowledge of 
the stakeholders. 
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